The Irrepressible Myth of \u3cem\u3eMarbury\u3c/em\u3e by Paulsen, Michael Stokes
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 101 Issue 8 
2003 
The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury 
Michael Stokes Paulsen 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, President/Executive Department 
Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael S. Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706 (2003). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol101/iss8/7 
 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan 
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE IRREPRESSIBLE MYTH OF MARBURY 
Michael Stokes Paulsen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nearly all of American constitutional law today rests on a myth. 
The myth, presented as standard history both in junior high civics texts 
and in advanced law school courses on constitutional law, runs 
something like this: A long, long time ago - 1803, if the storyteller is 
trying to be precise - in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison,1 the 
Supreme Court of the United States created the doctrine of "judicial 
review." Judicial review is the power of the Supreme Court to decide 
the meaning of the Constitution and to strike down laws that the 
Court finds unconstitutional. 
As befits the name of the court from which the doctrine emanates, 
the Supreme Court's power of judicial review - the power, in Chief 
Justice John Marshall's famous words in Marbury, "to say what the 
law is"2 - is supreme. The Congress, the President, the states -
indeed, "We the People" who "ordain[ ed] and establish[ ed] "3 the 
Constitution - are all bound by the Supreme Court's pronounce­
ments. Thus, the decisions of the Supreme Court become, in effect, 
part of the Constitution itself. Even the Supreme Court is bound by its 
own precedents, at least most of the time. Occasionally the Court 
needs to make landmark decisions that revise prior understandings, in 
order to keep the Constitution up to date with the times. When it 
does, that revised understanding becomes part of the supreme law of 
the land. Other than through the adoption of a constitutional amend-
* © Copyright Michael Stokes Paulsen 2003. Briggs & Morgan Professor of Law, 
University of Minnesota Law School. Graduate, John Marshall Elementary School (Wausau, 
Wisconsin, 1969). - Ed. Many people have influenced my thinking about Marbury v: 
Madison over the course of the years - so many that it is impossible to thank them all indi­
vidually (or even remember all of them). I nonetheless would like to give special thanks to 
those who read and commented on this specific manuscript (Dan Farber, Casey Duncan, 
Dale Carpenter, and John Nagle), to the other participants at this 200th anniversary sympo­
sium, and to the editors of the Michigan Law Review. 
The title of this Essay is inspired by John Hart Ely's The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974). Professor Ely, who died this year, was one of the greatest consti­
tutional scholars of our era. His thoughtfulness, insights, and good humor will long continue 
to serve as an inspiration and model for other scholars, as they have for me. 
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
2. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
3. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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ment, however, the Supreme Court is the final authority on constitu­
tional change. 
Judicial review (the myth continues) thus serves as the ultimate 
check on the powers of the other branches of government, and is one 
of the unique, crowning features of our constitutional democracy. The 
final authority of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution has 
withstood the test of time. It has survived periodic efforts by the 
political branches, advanced during times of crisis (the Civil War and 
the Great Depression) or out of short-term political opposition to 
initially unpopular or controversial rulings (like Brown v. Board of 
Education4 and Roe v. Wade5), to undermine this essential feature of 
our constitutional order. Through it all - Dred Scott and the Civil 
War, the New Deal Court-packing plan, resistance to Brown, the 
Nixon Tapes case,7 the Vietnam War, the quest to overrule Roe v. 
Wade - the authority of the Supreme Court as the final interpreter of 
the Constitution has stood firm. Indeed, the Court's authority over 
constitutional interpretation by now must be regarded, rightly, as one 
of the pillars of our constitutional order, on par with the Constitution 
itself. 
So the myth goes. 
But nearly every feature of the myth is wrong. For openers, 
Marbury v. Madison did not create the concept of judicial review, but 
(in this respect) applied well-established principles. The idea that 
courts possess an independent power and duty to interpret the law, 
and in the course of doing so must refuse to give effect to acts of the 
legislature that contravene the Constitution, was well accepted by the 
time Marbury rolled around, more than a dozen years after the 
Constitution was ratified. Such a power and duty was contemplated by 
the Framers of the Constitution, publicly defended in Alexander 
Hamilton's brilliant Federalist No. 78 (as well as other ratification 
debates), and well-recognized in the courts of many states for years 
prior to Marbury.8 
Moreover, and also contrary to the mythology that has come to 
surround Marbury, the power of judicial review was never understood 
by proponents and defenders of the Constitution as a power of judicial 
supremacy over the other branches, much less one of judicial exclusiv-
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
5. 410 U .S. 113 (1973). 
6. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
7. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
8. See generally SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 13-89 (1990) (setting forth pamphlets, legislative debates, and cases 
accepting the doctrine of judicial review from independence to Marbury); William Van 
Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 16-29 (explaining that 
the argument for judicial review was familiar and accepted by the time of Marbury). 
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ity in constitutional interpretation. Nothing in the text of the 
Constitution supports a claim of judicial supremacy. The courts pos­
sess "[t]he judicial Power of the United States"9 and that power ex­
tends to "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,"10 
but nothing in the logic or language of such a statement of constitu­
tionally authorized judicial jurisdiction implies judicial supremacy over 
the other branches of government. Jurisdiction to decide cases does 
not entail special guardianship over the Constitution. (If anyone could 
lay claim to the title of Special Trustee or Lord Protector of the 
Constitution, it would be the President, for whom the Constitution 
prescribes a unique oath that he will, "to the best of my Ability, pre­
serve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.")11 
None of the Constitution's authors or proponents ever suggested 
that the Constitution provides for judicial supremacy over the other 
branches in constitutional interpretation. All prominent defenses of 
the Constitution at the time of its adoption explicitly deny - indeed, 
take pains to refute - any such notion, which was sometimes charged 
by opponents of ratification but never accepted by the document's 
defenders.1 2 
Nothing in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury makes 
such a claim of judicial supremacy either. The standard civics-book 
(and law school casebook) myth misrepresents and distorts what John 
Marshall and the Framers understood to be the power of judicial 
review: a coordinate, coequal power of courts to judge for themselves 
the conformity of acts of the other two branches with the fundamental 
9. U.S. CONST. art. I I I , § l. 
10. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl.1 . 
11. U.S. CONST. art. II , § 1, cl. 8. I do not claim that the President's oath makes him the 
unique protector of the Constitution, vested with interpretive supremacy over the other 
branches. I claim only that the judiciary is not the unique protector of the Constitution, 
vested with interpretive supremacy over the other branches. 
The correct answer, James Madison and I submit, is that none of the branches has inter­
pretive supremacy over the others. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313 (James Madison) 
(Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("The several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the 
terms of their ccmmon commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclu­
sive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers.") For an 
extended defense, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive 
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994) [hereinafter, Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch]. 
12. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After 
Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1349-51 (1999) (hereinafter Paulsen, Nixon Now] 
(collecting authorities). Alexander Hamilton's The Federalist No. 78 is a careful defense of 
the propriety of judicial review while simultaneously an emphatic refutation of the 
anti-Federalist writer Brutus's accusation of judicial supremacy. See Paulsen, Nixon Now, 
supra, at 1350 n.39; id. at 1353-56 (collecting sources); see also GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING · 
AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 126-36 (1981). But cf JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 186-87 (1997) 
(intimating that Brutus, rather than Hamilton, may have correctly understood the judicial 
supremacist implications of Article III of the Constitution). 
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law of the Constitution, and to refuse to give acts contradicting the 
Constitution any force or effect insofar as application of the judicial 
power is concerned. 
That was a big enough deal in its own right. The idea that written 
constitutions could serve as judicially enforceable checks on the 
powers of legislatures elected by the people is an important, distinc­
tively American, contribution to what the founding generation called 
the science of politics.13 Written constitutionalism, combined with 
separation of powers - including an independent judiciary deriving its 
authority directly from the Constitution and not from the other 
branches - yields an independent judicial power to interpret and 
apply the Constitution in cases before the courts. That is the proposi­
tion of Marbury v. Madison, and it is a proposition of considerable 
significance (even if not original to the case). 
But that proposition is nowhere close to a holding, or claim, of 
judicial supremacy over the other branches - a notion that would 
have been anathema to the founding generation, and that the Supreme 
Court in Marbury appeared explicitly to disavow.14  Nothing in 
Marbury supports the modem myth of judicial supremacy in interpre­
tation of the Constitution. Quite the contrary, Marbury's holding of 
judicial review rests on premises of separation of powers that are 
fundamentally inconsistent with the assertion by any one branch of the 
federal government of a superior power of constitutional interpreta­
tion over the others. 
The logic of Marbury implies not, as it is so widely assumed today, 
judicial supremacy, but constitutional supremacy - the supremacy of 
the document itself over misapplications of its dictates by any and all 
subordinate agencies created by it. As a corollary, Marbury also stands 
for the independent obligation of each coordinate branch of the 
national government to be governed by that document rather than by 
departures from it committed by the other branches. Under Chief 
Justice John Marshall's reasoning (and Alexander Hamilton's before 
him in Federalist No. 78), the duty and power of judicial review do not 
mean the judiciary is supreme over the Constitution. Rather, the duty 
and power of judicial review exist in the first place because the 
Constitution is supreme over the judiciary and governs its conduct. As 
Marshall wrote in Marbury, "the framers of the constitution contem­
plated that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well 
as of the legislature."15 
13. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
1776-1787, at 3, passim (1969). 
14. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (disclaiming "all preten­
sions to . . .  jurisdiction" over matters in which political branches "have a discretion"). 
15. Marbury, 5 U.S. ( l Cranch) at 179-80. 
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It is the fundamental betrayal of Marbury's premises and 
Marbury's logic that accounts for nearly all of what is wrong with 
"constitutional law" today. The twin peaks of constitutional law today 
are judicial supremacy and interpretive license. Marbury refutes both 
propositions. Correctly read, Marbury stands for constitutional su­
premacy rather than judicial supremacy. And constitutional supremacy 
implies strict textualism as a controlling method of constitutional in­
terpretation, not free-wheeling judicial discretion. 
This Essay proceeds in two Parts. First, I will discuss John 
Marshall's near-flawless argument for judicial review. This should be 
familiar ground, but it is not. Marbury truly fits Mark Twain's defini­
tion of a "classic": a work that everybody praises but nobody actually 
reads.16 Marbury is invoked today for the myth it has become, not for 
its actual reasoning and logic. I will challenge the reader to attend 
closely to what Marbury actually says - the premises set forth; the 
logic of the argument - and to shed the judicial supremacist precon­
ceptions with which most modern readers, thoroughly corrupted by 
the Myth of Marbury, come to the case. If one does so, I believe, one 
will be forced to conclude that the case cannot bear a judicial su­
premacist reading. Marbury stands instead for constitutional suprem­
acy, judicial independence, interpretive coordinacy, and the personal 
responsibility of all who swear an oath to support the Constitution to 
be guided by their best understanding of the Constitution and not 
pliantly to accede to violations of the Constitution by other govern­
mental actors. 
The second half of the Essay will then sketch the rather 
remarkable - even stunning - but entirely logical implications of 
Marbury's argument. Constitutional supremacy, interpretive coordi­
nacy, and personal interpretive responsibility imply parallel duties of 
truly independent constitutional interpretation - that is, interpreta­
tion not controlled by the Supreme Court's decisions - by the execu­
tive and legislative branches of the national government, by all judges 
(irrespective of stare decisis), by juries, and even by agencies of state 
government. In short, if Marbury's reasoning is right, nearly all of our 
constitutional practice today is wrong. 
16. Cf MARK TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR: A JOURNEY AROUND THE WORLD 
241 (1897). Akhil Amar has made the same observation. Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, 
Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 445 
(1989). 
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II. MARB URY'S LOGIC 
Marbury v. Madison is, of course, wrong about a great many 
thingsY But on the essential point for which the case is justly 
celebrated - the judiciary's power of independent constitutional 
review of the lawfulness of acts of the other branches - Marbury's 
premises are unassailable, its logic impeccable, and its rhetoric beauti­
ful. All of which makes its contemporary betrayal so lamentable. 
As has been noted by too many people to count, Chief Justice 
John Marshall's opinion for the Court in Marbury is questionable, 
perhaps even deliberately mischievous, on a number of points.18 But it 
is hard to find fault in Marshall's proof for judicial review. In part, this 
is because the argument was so well-rehearsed in the work of earlier 
writers and prior judicial opinions. Talent borrows and genius steals. 
And John Marshall was undoubtedly a talented guy. In Marbury, 
Marshall displays his skills as a subtle and gifted plagiarist, shamelessly 
borrowing from Hamilton's The Federalist No. 78. But he does add his 
own distinctive and important twist, as we shall see. 
There are three core points to Marshall's argument for judicial 
review in Marbury. They can be summarized briefly, but then deserve 
attention in detail. 
First, Marshall's absolutely foundational starting point is the prin­
ciple of constitutional supremacy. Marshall finds this postulate inher­
ent in the nature of written constitutionalism. It is reinforced by some 
strongly supportive, specific textual provisions. It is not, however, an 
argument that derives its forces from any particular provision, but 
from the document as a whole. It is the fact of having a written consti­
tution, and the nature of written constitutionalism, that does the work. 
Marshall's second core proposition in Marbury is the interpretive 
independence of the several branches of government, a consequence 
that flows both from constitutional supremacy and, implicitly, from the 
structural separation of powers of the various departments of govern-
17. For an irreverent look at the case, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Marbury's 
Wrongness, 20 CONST. COMM. (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Paulsen, Marbury's Wrong­
ness]. 
18. The phrase that has caught on is Robert McCloskey's description of the opinion as a 
"masterpiece of indirection," ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 
40 (1960), in which Marshall simultaneously criticized the Jefferson administration as 
lawless; asserted the authority (in a proper case) to issue direct, coercive judicial orders to 
executive branch officers (at least with respect to ministerial duties and at least with respect 
to subordinate executive branch officers); avoided a direct confrontation with the President 
(which the Court surely would have lost) by finding no jurisdiction to issue the requested 
writ of mandamus to the Secretary of State; and in the process claimed the power of the ju­
diciary to strike down acts of the legislature that the judiciary finds to violate the 
Constitution. Sandy Levinson has characterized the opinion as "intellectually dishonest." 
Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 373, 389 (1982). Whether or not 
Marshall was dishonest, a lot of what the opinion says would seem to be just plain wrong. 
Paulsen, Marbury's Wrongness, supra note 17. 
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ment. Marshall's contention is that it would be utterly inconsistent 
with the first principle of constitutional supremacy - indeed, 
inconsistent to the point of absurdity - for one branch to be able to 
bind another with its (by hypothesis) erroneous constitutional actions 
or views. 
The third proposition of Marbury reinforces the conclusion 
following from the first two points, and it is Marshall's distinctive 
contribution to the traditional argument for judicial review. The 
obligation of the oath to support "this Constitution" requires that an 
interpreter have direct, unmediated recourse to the Constitution. 
Marshall's three arguments yield the specific conclusion of the 
power of judicial review of legislative acts - the legitimate power of 
courts to refuse to give effect to legislative acts that the courts find to 
be in violation of a rule of law supplied by the Constitution. But his 
arguments are fully generalizable: they equally support parallel 
powers of constitutional review by each branch of the actions of the 
others; and, moreover, they refute decisively any notion of judicial 
supremacy. 
Let us begin where Marshall does, with the postulate of constitu­
tional supremacy. Marshall begins his argument for judicial review, 
intriguingly, with the first principle of the American Revolution: the 
right of the people to establish such principles for their own 
self-government as they deem most conducive to their well-being, the 
priority of those fundamental principles over the actions of govern­
ment that depart from them, and the ultimate power of the people to 
judge whether such departures have occurred and to take remedial 
action. In a sense, the premises of the Declaration of Independence 
thus parallel the premises of judicial review, and one can hear distinct 
echoes of American revolutionary thought in the opening lines of 
Marshall's argument in Marbury: 
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future gov­
ernment, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their 
own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has 
been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; 
nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, there­
fore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from 
which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to 
be permanent.19 
This is the cornerstone from which Marshall proceeds. The 
Constitution, as an original act of self-government by the supreme 
authority - "We the People" - must be regarded as supreme law 
limiting all government. This proposition is reinforced, later in the 
Marbury opinion, by noting Article Vi's reference to the Constitution 
19. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176. 
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as "the supreme law of the land,"20 but it is, characteristically for 
Marshall, a structural inference - a deduction from the nature of self­
government and written constitutionalism, more than a specific text -
that establishes the postulate that the Constitution is supreme law. 
Marshall continues: 
This original and supreme will [that is, the People) organizes the gov­
ernment, and assigns, to different departments, their respective powers. 
It may either stop here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended 
by those departments. 
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The 
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits 
may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what 
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation com­
mitted to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those in­
tended to be restrained? The distinction, between a government with lim­
ited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not 
confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and 
acts allowed, are of equal obligation.21 
Note how Marshall's argument is a general one, not necessarily limited 
to legislative violations of the Constitution. The Constitution's alloca­
tion of powers establishes "limits not to be transcended" by any of the 
different departments. The powers of the legislature are defined and 
limited in writing, but the same is of course true of the executive and 
the judiciary. Those limitations are binding, or else written constitu­
tionalism - the power of the People to establish limits on their gov­
ernment agents - is abolished. 
Marshall then draws the conclusion - deduces the theorem - that 
legislative enactments that violate the Constitution are void, since the 
only alternative is the unacceptable one of denying the supremacy of 
the written Constitution: 
It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls 
any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the 
constitution by an ordinary act. 
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitu­
tion is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary 
means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, 
is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. 
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act 
contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then writ­
ten constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a 
power, in its own nature illimitable. 
20. Id .. at 180 (quoting, apparently, Art. VI, cl. 2 of the Constitution). 
21. Id. at 176-77 (emphasis added). 
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Certainly all those who framed written constitutions contemplate 
them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and 
consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of 
the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void. 
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is 
consequently to be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental 
principles of our society. It is not therefore to be lost sight of in the further 
consideration of this subject. 22 
This fundamental principle of constitutional supremacy is, 
however, "lost sight of" in almost all further consideration of the 
subject of judicial review by today's academics, judges, lawyers, and 
students. They rush to a line that shows up a few paragraphs later in 
the opinion - "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is"23 - but wrench it from context. 
Marshall's argument, to this point, has been that the written 
Constitution prevails over the inconsistent actions of government or 
else the Constitution is meaningless. And this point (as I will develop 
below) surely applies to the judiciary as well as the legislature. Indeed, 
one can (and, in a moment, I will) repeat Marshall's argument to this 
point, substituting the words "court" for "legislature" and "judicial 
judgment" for "legislative act," with no change in the logic and flow of 
the argument. And, of course, one can make precisely the same argu­
ment for "president" and "executive action." Thus, it is a proposition 
"too plain to be contested" that either the Constitution controls the 
actions of the President and the decisions of the judiciary, or that the 
President and Supreme Court may alter the Constitution by their or­
dinary actions. If the Constitution is the "fundamental and paramount 
law of the nation," then, under the logic of Marbury, the theory of our 
government must be that "an act [of the President, or of th e  courts], 
repugnant to the Constitution, is void" in the same way as an act of the 
legislature. 
This principle, not "to be lost sight of in the further consideration 
of this subject," helps to frame Marshall's second step in the argument 
for judicial review in Marbury. That step is to ask whether the judici­
ary must give effect to unconstitutional enactments of the legislature: 
"If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does 
it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to 
give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it consti­
tute a rule as operative as if it was a law?"24 
22. Id. at 177 (emphasis added). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
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This, Marshall says bluntly, would be ridiculous. It "would be to 
overthrow in fact what was established in theory."25 It would be, 
Marshall says (in one of my favorite judicial phrases of all time), "an 
absurdity too gross to be insisted on."26 
Is this because the Court, and not Congress, is designated as the 
authoritative interpreter of the Constitution? The next line in 
Marbury is the oft-quoted one that many take as supporting such a 
view: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart­
ment to say what the law is."27 But this does not get one very far. It is 
just a sonorous paraphrase of Hamilton's line in The Federalist No. 78 
that "[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar prov­
ince of the courts."28 Neither Marshall's version nor Hamilton's claims 
exclusive or superior interpretive authority for the courts. Moreover, 
often neglected are the immediately following sentences from the 
same paragraph of Marbury, which explain why it is the province of 
courts to say what the law is: "Those who apply the rule to particular· 
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws 
conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of 
each."29 This is a far cry from a claim of judicial supremacy, It is 
merely a statement that, when performing the judicial task calls for 
deciding whether an act of Congress departs from the Constitution, 
the courts are up to the task. It is within the judicial province to make 
such a determination, and to make it independently of what Congress 
has determined. (Remember: the whole point Marshall is trying to 
make is that the courts are not bound by Congress's say-so - that this 
would be an "absurdity too gross to be insisted on."30) Making those 
types of determinations is no different in principle from the work 
courts do all the time when faced with conflicting statutes (a point 
Marshall also lifts straight from The Federalist No. 78).31 But it is 
a huge and illogical stretch, one certainly not warranted by the 
"emphatically the province" sentence and indeed quite inconsistent 
with the rest of Marshall's argument, to move from the proposition 
that the courts are competent to determine constitutional cases to the 




28. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
29. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
30. Id. 
31 .  THE FEDERALIST, supra note 28, at 439 (discussing judicial determination of the ef­
fect of inconsistent laws - "it is the province of the courts to liquidate and fix their meaning 
and operation" - and its similarities and differences with judicial determination of the ef­
fect of inconsistent constitutional and statutory provisions). 
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Marbury is simply not very well grounded in the actual language of 
Marbury. 
In fact, the same arguments that Marshall uses to develop the 
proposition of independent judicial interpretation tend to support the 
conclusion that the other branches are similarly competent to interpret 
the Constitution and likewise not bound by the erroneous interpreta­
tions of their fellow branches: 
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be 
considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of 
maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see 
only the law. 
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written consti­
tutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to the principles 
and theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, com­
pletely obligatory. It would declare, that if the legislature shall do what is 
expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is 
in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and 
real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their 
powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that 
those limits may be passed at pleasure.32 
Such a view, Marshall warns, "reduces to nothing what we have 
deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions - a written 
constitution." That, he says, is "sufficient, in America" to reject the 
contention.33 
What is truly arresting about Marshall's arguments here - at least 
to eyes not conditioned to reading Marbury through judicial suprema­
cist lenses and shut to what Marbury actually says - is that the exact 
same reasoning would seem to apply with equal force to executive and 
legislative constitutional review of the propriety of acts of the judici­
ary. If the nature of a written constitution implies enforceable limita­
tions on the powers exercised by the organs of government created 
thereunder, it implies limitations on the powers of courts, as well as 
Congress and the President. (Just a few paragraphs later, Marshall will 
write that the Constitution is an instrument "for the government of 
courts, as well as of the legislature."34) If requiring courts to carry out 
acts of the legislature contrary to the limits set by the Constitution 
"would overthrow in fact what was established in theory" and consti­
tute "an absurdity too gross to be insisted on,'' so too in principle re­
quiring the political branches to carry out decisions or precedents of 
the courts contrary to the limits set by the Constitution likewise 
would, absurdly, "overthrow in fact what was established in theory." 
32. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178. · 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 180. 
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If the Constitution supplies rules and principles that Congress and 
the President must apply in performing their duties, just as it supplies 
rules and principles that courts must apply in performing theirs, are 
Congress and the President permitted to interpret the Constitution 
directly, or are they required to "close their eyes on the constitution" 
and "see only" the decisions of the courts? Marbury says that such a 
restriction, at least where urged on courts, "would subvert the very 
foundation of all written constitutions."35 Why this would not equally 
be true if the tables were turned is hard to answer, unless one were to 
assume judicial infallibility and perfect will-less-ness by the courts. But 
assuming that the courts might, like the legislature, misinterpret or 
misapply the Constitution, to then require the political branches to be 
bound by the courts' departure from the "fundamental and paramount 
law of the nation" would similarly be to "declare that an act" - here, 
an act of the judiciary - "which, according to the principles and 
theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, com­
pletely obligatory."36 It would be to declare that if the courts do "what 
is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibi­
tion, is in reality effectual."37 It would be giving to the courts "a practi­
cal and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to 
restrict their powers within narrow limits."38 Indeed, such a doctrine 
would, by Marbury's logic, "reduce[] to nothing what we have deemed 
the greatest improvement on political institutions - a written consti­
tution"!39 
Alexander Bickel, writing more than forty years ago in his classic 
book, The Least Dangerous Branch, made this same observation about 
Marbury's logic, but went exactly the wrong way with it. It was 
perhaps true, Bickel conceded to John Marshall, that to leave the 
question of constitutionality to the legislature would, absurdly, "allow 
those whose power is supposed to be limited themselves to set the 
limits." But the same could be said of the courts: "[T]he Constitution 
does not limit the power of the legislature alone. It limits that of the 
courts as well, and it may be equally absurd, therefore, to allow courts 
to set the limits. "40 
For Bickel, this was a weakness in John Marshall's argument, for 
surely Marshall could not have intended to rest the power of judicial 
review, and against legislative supremacy, on premises that equally 





40. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
ATTHE BAR OF POLITICS 3-4 (2d ed. 1988). 
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could be deployed against the supremacy of the judiciary's constitu­
tional determinations! But Bickel, like so many who have followed 
him, erred in assuming that the point of Marbury was to establish judi­
cial supremacy rather than to demolish legislative supremacy and 
establish coequal and independent judicial interpretive competence. 
The problem with Bickel's critique of Marbury was that he assumed 
that Marshall was trying to prove the modern Myth of Marbury, when 
Marshall was doing nothing of the kind. Bickel could not and did not 
point to any flaw in Marshall's reasoning - in fact, Bickel's analysis 
agrees with my own about where Marshall's reasoning leads. But · 
Marbury's reasoning in that case does not yield the conclusion that 
Bickel thought it ought to, or needed to, in order to .justify modern 
practice. That is precisely my point: Marbury's reasoning and modern 
constitutional practice are hopelessly irreconcilable with each other. 
Marbury's logic stands opposed to any claim of judicial supremacy -
the idea that the other branches are bound by the courts' actions no 
matter what. Bickel's analysis supports, quite unintentionally, my posi­
tion here.41 
The attentive defender of judicial supremacy might at this point 
interject that the premise of this extension of Marbury's reasoning is 
that the Court is as likely to err as the political branches. Not at all. 
The premise is that the Court could err and that there is no more 
reason in principle - and none remotely suggested in the pages of 
Marbury - for Branch X to be bound by Branch Y's errors than for 
Branch Z to be bound by Branch X's. Marshall's whole argument for 
the coordinate interpretive competence and independence of the judi­
ciary assumes the existence of an unconstitutional action by another 
branch. In such an instance, it is "an absurdity too gross to be insisted 
on" to require a coordinate branch to be bound, within the province of 
its duties, to enforce or acquiesce in such an act, contrary to the para­
mount law of the nation. Nowhere does Marshall say that "unconstitu­
tional" is defined by whatever a court, and a court alone, says. Rather, 
he treats "unconstitutional" as an objective fact - whether something 
is unconstitutional is determined, interestingly enough, by what the 
Constitution says.42 
It is at this point that Marshall turns, finally, to specific constitu­
tional provisions, which he uses not as proof-texts of judicial suprem­
acy but as examples of the absurdity of requiring that courts be bound, 
within the sphere of their power and in the performance of their 
duties, by a plain violation of the Constitution perpetrated by another 
branch. In each case, the argument can be turned around and applied 
41. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 11,  at 245. 
42. I will have more to say about this below. See infra Section III.E (arguing that one of 
the implications of Marbury is that the proper controlling methodology of constitutional 
interpretation is textualism.) 
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to interpretation of the Constitution by the executive and legislative 
branches. 
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising 
under the constitution. 
Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that, in 
using it, the constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising 
under the constitution should be decided without examining the instru­
ment under which it arises? 
This is too extravagant to be maintained. 
In some cases then, the constitution must be looked into by the 
judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to 
read, or to obey?43 
Flawlessly logical. But the same logic applies, for example, to the 
President: the executive power of Article II extends to all matters of 
enforcement or execution of U.S. law. Moreover, the President is spe­
cifically charged to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," 
presumably including the Constitution as the paramount law of the 
Nation, and further obliged to swear an oath to "preserve, protect, and 
defend the Constitution of the United States."44 Could it be the inten­
tion of those who gave this power, and imposed a duty of faithfulness 
to the Constitution, to say that in carrying it out the Constitution 
should not be looked into? That a situation arising under the 
Constitution should be decided without examining the instrument 
itself? This, like a similar disability on the courts, "is too extravagant 
to be maintained." In some cases, the Constitution must be looked 
into by the President. If he can open it at all, what part is he forbidden 
to read? 
The point is particularly easy to make with respect to the 
President, because the constitutional provisions giving him power and 
responsibility to "take Care" to faithfully execute the laws and to 
"preserve, protect, and defend" the Constitution are remarkably clear 
in assigning duties that require interpretation of the Constitution. 
Indeed, I have had some students advance the view, which I allude to 
above, that the Constitution in express terms makes the President, not 
the courts, the special "Guardian of the Constitution"! One need not 
go so far in order to make the simpler point that Article Ill's 
assignment of "the judicial Power" to decide cases "arising under the 
Constitution" does not, in a regime of separation of powers, create a 
superior power of constitutional interpretation than does Article II's 
43. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178-79. 
44. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("(H)e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe­
cuted . . . .  "); U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1, cl. 8 (prescribing presidential oath to "preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States"). 
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assignment of a duty to "preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution of the United States." 
The same point can be made (albeit more awkwardly) with respect 
to Congress, and indeed with respect to all who exercise power under 
the Constitution. Every act of Congress is an implicit act of constitu­
tional interpretation concerning the scope of its Article I (or other 
legislative) powers. Under the logic of Marbury, if Congress is obliged 
to consider the question of the constitutional propriety of its actions, 
could it be the intention of those who imposed such an obligation to 
say that, in making the determination, the Constitution itself should 
not be looked into? 
Marshall then proceeds with hypothetical examples of constitu­
tional questions that easily could come up in a case appropriate for 
judicial resolution. 
There are many other parts of the constitution which serve to illus­
trate this subject. 
It is declared that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported 
from any state." Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of 
flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered 
in such a case? ought the judges to close their eye.s on the constitution, 
and only see the law? 
The constitution declares that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law 
shall be passed." 
If, however, such a bill should be passed and a person should be 
prosecuted under it; must the court condemn to death those victims 
whom the constitution endeavors to preserve? 
"No person," says the constitution, "shall be convicted of treason un­
less on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on 
confession in open court." 
Here the language of the constitution is addressed especially to the 
courts. It prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be de­
parted from. If the legislature should change that rule, and declare one 
witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for conviction, must the 
constitutional principle yield to the legislative act? 
From these, and many other selections which might be made, it is ap­
parent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instru­
ment, as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legisla­
ture.45 
Once again, Marshall's logic is impeccable. And once again, it is 
easy to turn these hypotheticals into situations calling for executive or 
congressional interpretation of the Constitution, and pose the same 
rhetorical questions: Should Congress "close its eyes" to the 
45. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179-80. 
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Constitution before passing a law that is arguably a bill of attainder or 
an ex post facto law, or imposing an export duty on articles from a 
particular state, deferring such constitutional questions to (possible) 
subsequent judicial determination? If the courts' precedents would 
uphold such a law in instances where Congress reads the Constitution 
to forbid such action, should Congress close its eyes? Or is it at least 
competent to judge for itself, within its province?46 What if Congress 
passed, and the courts upheld, an unconstitutional tax or duty, or a bill 
of attainder or ex post facto law, or convicted a man of treason on the 
strength of the testimony of one witness rather than two? Would the 
President be bound to execute the law, shutting his eyes to the 
Constitution? If Congress should pass such a law, and a prior admini­
stration brought a prosecution pursuant to it, and a court wrongly 
"condemn[ ed) to death those victims whom the constitution endeavors 
to preserve," must the President go along? 
There are, of course, some difficult questions posed by a theory 
that permits multiple actors independently to interpret the 
Constitution, particularly the question of which interpretation will or 
should prevail.47 But my point here is simply that none of the 
hypotheticals posed by Marshall remotely suggests judicial exclusivity 
or even judicial priority in constitutional interpretation. They all 
involve constitutional questions of a type that could (and should) be 
considered in the ordinary course of business of the legislative and 
executive branches. There is nothing uniquely judicial about them, so 
as to suggest in any way that constitutional interpretation is a uniquely 
judicial activity. Marshall's point - the crux of his argument for an in­
dependent power of judicial review - is that constitutional supremacy 
implies independent interpretive power because, once it is assumed 
that a coordinate branch might depart from the Constitution, it 
becomes absurd to say that one of the other coordinate branches is 
bound to ratify the error and is foreclosed from looking directly to the 
words and logic of the document itself. 
Marshall's third major argument in support of judicial review flows 
from the judges' oath to support the Constitution. Up to this point, 
Marshall's opinion has had the feel of a straightforward, deductive 
mathematical proof. It is only when he gets to the oath that the opin-
46. More problematically, if the courts' precedents would strike down such a law in 
instances where Congress reads the Constitution to permit such action, is Congress bound to 
see only the judicial decision, and not the Constitution? Congress may have the prerogative 
of independent constitutional interpretation in such a case, but it has no power to require the 
judiciary to agree and abandon its independent interpretive power. This leaves open the 
question of whether it is legitimate for Congress, in pressing a position that probably will 
prove futile, to impose the costs of proving such futility on individual litigants. But that in 
the end is a question more of prudence and policy than of constitutional power. 
47. For a discussion of how a decentralized model of constitutional interpretive power 
might work, see Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 1 1 ,  at 321-42. 
2722 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:2706 
ion becomes genuinely impassioned.48 Immediately after stating that 
the Constitution is "a rule for the government of courts, as well as of 
the legislature," Marshall asks: 
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? 
This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their conduct in 
their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were 
to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating 
what they swear to support! 
* * * 
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the 
constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his 
government? if it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him? 
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. 
To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime.49 
A crime! Marshall takes the oath requirement very seriously; 
indeed, the founding generation as a whole took oath-taking 
extremely seriously.so Article VI of the Constitution requires that all 
legislative, executive, and judicial officers, both of the United States 
government and of the governments of the states, "be bound by Oath 
or Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . .  "s1 And, as we have 
already observed, Article II of the Constitution prescribes a special 
oath for the President, under which he is required to swear or affirm 
that he will, to the best of his ability, "preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States."s2 
The implication of Marshall's argument from the oath requirement 
is obvious: Marbury is no argument for judicial supremacy in constitu­
tional interpretation. It is an argument for the personal constitutional 
responsibility of all who swear an oath to support the Constitution to 
resist and refuse support to usurpations or violations of that 
Constitution by all others. To paraphrase Marbury once again, why 
does the Constitution require that members of Congress, the 
President, other federal judges, state judges, state legislatures, and 
state executives, all swear an oath to discharge their duties agreeably 
to the Constitution of the United States if that Constitution forms no 
48. See id. at 257-58. 
49. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 1 80. 
50. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1457, 1 486-90 (1997) (discussing centrality and seriousness of oath requirements for 
sworn testimony to understanding the original meaning, in social context, of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, 
supra note 1 1 ,  at 257 & n.150 (discussing oath requirements and their importance in the 
founding generation). 
51 .  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
52. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1, cl. 8. 
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rule for their government? If it is closed to them, and cannot be 
inspected by them? "If such be the real state of things, this is worse 
than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes 
equally a crime."53 
Again, Alexander Bickel is an unwitting ally in my cause. Here is 
his critique of Marshall's argument on this point: 
Far from supporting Marshall, the oath is perhaps the strongest textual 
argument against him. For it would seem to obligate each of these officers, 
in the performance of his own function, to support the Constitution . . . . 
Surely the language lends itself more readily to this interpretation than 
to Marshall's apparent conclusion, that everyone's oath to support the. 
Constitution is qualified by the judiciary's oath to do the same, and that 
every official of government is sworn to support the Constitution as the 
judges, in the pursuance of the same oath, have construed it, rather than 
as his own conscience may dictate.54 
Hold the phone a minute: What makes this latter alternative 
"Marshall's apparent conclusion"? Is this anything other than the 
modern Myth of Marbury, read back into the case from a distance of 
a century and a half? Bickel was right, that the oath would seem to 
obligate each of these officers, in the performance of his own function, 
to support - and thus independently interpret, according to Marbury 
- the Constitution. But Bickel was wrong in thinking that this 
furnishes any sort of argument against Marshall's conclusion, for the 
simple reason that Bickel was wrong about what Marshall's conclusion 
was. 
The Oath Clause is an important argument in Marbury. It is 
Marshall's icing on the cake of his proof of judicial review, a moral 
clincher that is Marshall's distinctive addition to the well-accepted 
argument for judicial review. And it is one, as we shall see in a mo­
ment, that has important implications in its own right, for it is the only 
purely textual (as opposed to structural or inferential) argument in 
Marbury that supports independent interpretive power by agencies of 
state government. 
The final substantive paragraph of Marbury ends the opinion with 
what is, comparatively, a whimper. "It is also not entirely unworthy of 
observation," Marshall writes, half-heartedly, that the Supremacy 
Clause of Article VI lists the Constitution first, in its listing of what 
constitutes the "supreme law of the Land" and gives a similar status to 
statutes "made in pursuance of the constitution." This is only weak 
supportive evidence of a power of judicial review, because the 
53. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180. I develop the Oath Clause argument at greater 
length in other work, drawing as well on President Andrew Jackson's reliance on the oath in 
support of his veto, on constitutional grounds that had been rejected by the Supreme Court, 
of the bill rechartering the Bank of the United States. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, 
supra note 1 1 ,  at 257-62. 
54. BICKEL, supra note 40, at 8 (emphasis added). 
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Supremacy Clause proceeds to say that the judges "in every state" 
shall be bound by that supreme law. Still, Marshall notes, the 
Supremacy Clause "confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed 
to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the 
constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are 
bound by that instrument. "55 
Once again, the concluding paragraph is hard to square with the 
judicial supremacist Myth of Marbury. If "courts, as well as other 
departments" are "bound by that instrument," it would seem to follow 
that the other departments are bound to hold the courts, as well as 
each other, to "that instrument" and to serve as independent interpre­
tive checks against deviations from the Constitution's commands. 
Ill. MARBURY'S IMPLICATIONS 
If Marbury's logic is right, then nearly all of our contemporary 
constitutional practice is wrong. The myth of judicial supremacy that 
stands at the center of constitutional law today - the notion that the 
Supreme Court's decisions are final and binding on all other actors in 
our constitutional system, no matter what, so that all that really 
matters in constitutional law is the Supreme Court's decisions and 
precedents - is utterly groundless as a matter of first principles of the 
Constitution. The myth finds no support in the text, structure, or 
history of the Constitution.56 Instead, it rests on a complete misreading 
of the case that is supposed to be the source and justification for the 
myth: Marbury. 
What if we were to take Marbury's logic seriously on its own terms, 
and apply faithfully its core propositions: constitutional supremacy, 
interpretive independence, and the personal responsibility conferred 
by the oath to support the Constitution? In this Section, I will sketch, 
in broad strokes, four seemingly radical but entirely logical implica- , 
tions of Marbury, and a fifth implication that is not at all radical but 
also presents an indictment of present constitutional practice. My first , 
four propositions are: 
(1) the existence of a power of "executive review" parallel to the power 
of judicial review; 
(2) the existence of a coequal power of congressional constitutional in­
terpretation; 
(3) the unconstitutionality of the doctrine of stare decisis in constitu­
tional law; and 
55. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 1 80. 
56. I have developed this specific proposition and supporting evidence at length in other 
writing, and will not repeat those points here. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, su- · 
pra note 1 1 ,  at 228-62, 292-321; Paulsen, Nixon Now, supra note 12, at 1349-58. 
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( 4) the existence of a legitimate power of state government officials to 
engage in independent federal constitutional interpretation, in 
matters within their province. 
My fifth proposition, somewhat less controversial than the others, 
is that Marbury's conception of written constitutionalism implies 
a particular methodology of constitutional interpretation: originalist 
textualism - that is, the binding authority of the written constitutional 
text, considered as a whole and taken in context, as its words and 
phrases would have been understood by reasonably well-informed 
speakers or readers of the English language at the time. 
A. "Executive Review" 
It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the executive 
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the law to par­
ticular instances - and execution of the law is a quintessential 
example of applying the law to particular cases - must of necessity 
expound and interpret the law in the course of performing such 
duties.57 The President applies the law. The Constitution is a rule for 
the governance of the President (and his subordinates58), as well as for 
the courts and for Congress. Indeed, as noted, that instrument 
commands the President to "take Care that the laws be faithfully 
executed."59 The laws of the nation include its Constitution, which is 
listed first in Article VI's description of the "supreme law of the 
Land." As Marbury correctly holds, the Constitution is the "para­
mount law of the nation," and is thus of superior obligation to other 
sources of law, like statutes and even judgments of the courts. The 
President is specifically assigned the sworn duty to "preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States." It follows that, in 
carrying out his executive duties as President, the President must give 
effect to the Constitution in preference to a statute, or judicial decree, 
in cases where they conflict. Again, to borrow Marbury's words, "[t]his 
is of the very essence of [presidential] duty."60 If a statute, or a judicial 
57. Cf Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (using parallel language with respect to the 
judicial department). 
58. The structure of Article II, which vests the executive power solely in "a President," 
binds all other executive branch officers to the President's constitutional interpretation when 
exercising executive power on the President's behalf. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to Professors Levinson and Eisgruber, 
83 GEO. L.J. 385, 387-88 (1994) (stating that "[t]he situation of subordinate executive offi­
cials raises a special problem" in that " [t]he President is the executive branch" and subordi­
nates have no constitutional right or authority to substitute their views for his, but nonethe­
less have a moral obligation not to act in violation of their sworn oaths to support the 
Constitution - a moral obligation that might require resignation in some circumstances). 
59. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3, cl. 4. 
60. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178. ("This is of the very essence of judicial duty."). 
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ruling, be in opposition to the Constitution, such that the President 
must either take action conformably with the Constitution or con­
formably with the act of Congress or decision of the judiciary, he must 
choose - and he must choose the Constitution. 
If, therefore, the President is to regard the Constitution, and to 
regard it as superior to any ordinary act of a subordinate institution 
created under it, must he close his eyes on the Constitution and see 
only the act of Congress or the decision of the courts? Why does he . 
swear an oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution if it is 
closed to him? The oath certainly applies in a special manner to the 
President's conduct in his official character. How immoral to impose it 
on him, if he must be used as the instrument, and the knowing instru­
ment, for violating what he has sworn to preserve, protect, and 
defend! To require the President to swear such an oath, yet require 
him, when persuaded that another branch has acted inconsistently 
with the Constitution, nonetheless to enforce its statute or its judicial 
judgment, makes a solemn mockery of the oath. 
The argument for "executive review" - the power and duty of the 
President to exercise independent legal judgment and review of the 
validity of the actions of both other coordinate branches - is thus 
almost exactly parallel to the argument for judicial review set forth in 
Marbury. The President is bound by the Constitution. He is not bound 
by acts of other branches where those acts are contrary to the 
Constitution, and he is not bound by those branches' views concerning 
the constitutional propriety of their own acts, if indeed those views are 
wrong by the lights of the Constitution itself. Rather, the President 
possesses an independent power of constitutional review of the actions 
of the other branches in any matter that falls within the sphere of his 
governing powers as President under Article II of the Constitution. 
This means that, just as the Supreme Court may, indeed must, refuse 
to apply an unconstitutional statute of Congress, so too the President 
may, indeed must, refuse to carry into execution an unconstitutional 
statute of Congress. That is precisely the same situation as Marbury: 
constitutional legal review of an act of Congress. But executive review, 
by the same logic, also means that the President may, indeed must, 
refuse to execute or carry out a decision of the judiciary that exceeds 
the limits the Constitution has imposed on that branch. This is consti­
tutional legal review of the decisions of courts. Such a view stands in 
opposition to the operative premises of our constitutional system 
today. Almost no constitutional scholar today embraces such a view, 
but it follows inexorably from the logic of Marbury.61 Certain provi-
61. I have set forth this argument, derived in part from Marbury and in part from other 
originalist sources, at length (with important qualifications and refinements) in earlier 
writing. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 1 1 .  A few have followed the 
logic of this argument ninety percent of the way or better, see, e.g. , Steven G. Calabresi, 
Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor Paulsen, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1421 (1999); Gary 
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sions of the Constitution might be read as imposing specific restric­
tions on the President's power to act on his independent interpretation 
of the Constitution;62 the power might be restrained by principles of 
interpretive restraint and method;63 and the power is of course subject 
to the check of the other branches' exercise of their independent inter­
pretive powers. But in principle, the President's power of constitu­
tional interpretation is closely parallel to the courts'. Thus, the 
Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution, federal statutes, 
and treaties no more bind the President than the President's or Con­
gress's interpretations bind the Court. All of this, I submit, follows 
from Marbury, if one reads Marbury for what it says rather than for 
what it has been misappropriated to mean. 
B. "Congressional Review" 
If the presidency's awesome and wide-ranging constitutional 
powers and strategic position, combined with independent interpretive 
authority, make it "The Most Dangerous Branch,"64 it is not an 
unchecked branch. Not only the courts, but also Congress, have a 
power and province of constitutional interpretation. Congress inter­
prets the Constitution, implicitly or explicitly, all the time, in the 
course of performing its legislative duties. Indeed, it is no exaggeration 
to say that Congress interprets the Constitution every time it enacts a 
law, implicitly asserting that its enactment is within the scope of its 
constitutional powers. Congress may employ its legislative powers 
(and additional powers not strictly "legislative" in character) to check 
the errant or willful interpretations of the President or of the courts, 
and to advance its own views of the proper interpretation of constitu­
tional provisions. 
Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996), but I believe that no other scholar follows the logic of Marbury 
in this regard all the way to its logical conclusion. See Paulsen, Nixon Now, supra note 12, at 
1355-57, n.66 (responding to these ninety-percenters); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993) (arguing that there ultimately is no middle ground between the 
competing premises of judicial supremacy and the coordinacy of the several branches of the 
federal government). 
62. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 11,  at 288 ("There are, of course, 
certain provisions of the Constitution the best reading of which specifically restricts the 
power of the executive branch to enforce its understanding of the law against individuals 
without the assent of some judicial actor."); id. at 288-92 (discussing the binding interpretive 
power of grand and petit juries in criminal cases, and the limited "gatekeeper" role of the 
judiciary in preserving this "trump-everybody" interpretive province of the jury). 
63. Id. at 331-43 (discussing principles of "deference," "accommodation," and "execu­
tive restraint"). 
64. This is the title of my earlier article on executive branch constitutional interpretive 
power. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 11 .  
2728 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 101:2706 
Marbury, of course, is all about independent judicial review of acts 
of Congress. But the premises and logic of Marbury - constitutional 
supremacy, interpretive coordinacy, and the responsibility of all who 
swear to support the Constitution to be guided by the document itself 
and not by the misinterpretations of the other branches - fully sup­
port a province and duty of Congress independently to interpret the 
Constitution. The Constitution governs Congress, along with the other 
branches, and the Constitution's requirements are paramount, taking 
precedence over both presidential actions and judicial decrees that 
exceed the limits of those branches' constitutional powers. Must 
Congress nonetheless acquiesce in the actions or views of the Article 
II or Article III branches, where such actions depart from the lan­
guage of the document? If presidential or judicial action repugnant to 
the constitution is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind 
Congress and oblige it to give effect to this action (assuming Congress 
possessed an effectual power with which to resist, or defeat, such 
unconstitutional executive or judicial action)? That would be, in 
Marbury's words, to overthrow in fact what was established in theory. 
And it would also require senators and representatives to violate their 
oaths: Article VI mandates that all members of Congress swear an 
oath to support the Constitution. Such oath, by Marbury's lights, 
would be a solemn mockery - and to swear it would be "a crime" -
if Congress were forbidden to read the Constitution itself and inquire 
directly into the constitutional validity of acts of the other branches, 
but instead relegated to a role of docile servility to the constitutional · 
determinations of one or both of the other branches. 
Marbury's logic thus yields the same conclusion for Congress as it 
does for the President: Congress is not bound by the constitutional 
views of either the President or the Supreme Court in the exercise of its 
constitutional powers, and may press its views with all the constitutional 
powers at its disposal. 
And Congress has quite a number of such powers, some with po­
tentially sweeping consequence. Congress (the Senate alone, actually) ' 
possesses a substantial role in checking appointments of both ' 
executive and judicial officers, and it properly may exercise its power 
in this area based on its vision of how the Constitution should be 
interpreted and applied by the executive branch and by the courts.65 
Congress possesses substantial control over the jurisdiction and reme­
dial authority of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, and 
may employ that power to rein in an imperial judiciary.66 Congress 
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause). See generally Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Straightening Out The Confirmation Mess, 105 YALE L.J. 549, 562-78 (1995) (re­
viewing Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning Up the Federal Appointments 
Process (1994) and making the argument for this proposition in detail). 
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (power to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme 
Court"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (power to make laws "necessary and proper for 
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possesses broad discretion to enact laws "necessary and proper" for 
carrying into execution the powers of the judicial department. This 
discretion includes the power to prescribe rules of decision, procedure, 
and evidence that can substantially constrain judicial decisionmaking 
and, quite possibly, require the courts to hew to Congress's vision of 
the Constitution's text, structure, and intent.67 As the ultimate trump 
card, Congress also possesses the power to impeach (the House of 
Representatives) and remove (the Senate) executive or judicial offi­
cers for "high crimes and misdemeanors," a term that does not have a 
fixed, determinate meaning and, I submit, legitimately can extend to 
violations by an executive or judicial officer of his or her constitutional 
oath and constitutional responsibilities, as determined by the ultimate 
independent judgment of the House and the Senate.68 Thus, Congress 
may impeach and remove a President whom Congress sincerely 
believes has acted in deliberate violation of the Constitution or of his 
constitutional duties, as interpreted (presumably in good faith) by 
Congress. Likewise, Congress may impeach and remove federal 
judges, including justices of the Supreme Court, who in the ultimate 
judgment of Congress, act in deliberate violation or disregard of the 
Constitution or otherwise willfully ignore, manipulate, or disregard 
controlling law. 
That last proposition, of course, is utter blasphemy in the constitu­
tional world dominated by the Myth of Marbury. In a regime of judi­
cial interpretive supremacy, impeachment of justices on the ground 
that their decisions deliberately and flagrantly violate the Constitution 
(and thus violate their oaths) makes no sense. The justices' decisions 
are the Constitution. Impeachment on such a ground reflects a basic 
confusion on the part of Congress.69 
carrying into Execution . . .  all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government 
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof"); U.S. CONST. art. I I I ,  § 1 
(reference to "such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab­
lish"); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (allocation of jurisdiction among federal courts subject 
to "such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."). On the 
power of Congress over matters of judicial practice, procedure, and remedies, see Wayman 
v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 21-22 (1825) ("That a power to make laws for carrying 
into execution all the judgments which the judicial department has power to pronounce, is 
expressly conferred by [the Necessary and Proper Clause], seems to be one of those plain 
propositions which reasoning cannot render plainer. The terms of the clause neither require 
nor admit of elucidation."). 
67. See generally Wayman, 23 U.S. at 21-22. For a defense of congressional power to 
prescribe rules of judicial decision, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by 
Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 
1535, 1567-99 (2000) [hereinafter Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute] (collecting 
cases and examples); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lawson 's Awesome (Also Wrong, Some), 18 
CONST. COMM. 231 (2001) (responding to objections to this view). 
68. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Impeachment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1340 (L.W. Levy et al. eds., 2000). 
69. A judicial supremacist Supreme Court (that is to say, the Supreme Court of the past 
fifty years or so) would quite possibly be prepared to intervene to hold such an impeachment 
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But if the correct understanding of Marbury, and of the 
Constitution, is that no branch has interpretive supremacy; that each 
branch has independent interpretive power within its own sphere; and 
that the standard governing each, and to which each is required to ad­
here, is the Constitution itself, then impeachment of judges on the 
ground of constitutional infidelity is not confused at all: it is the ulti­
mate, and perhaps the only truly effective, means by which Congress 
might, with the cooperation of the executive, resist and check a series 
of attempted usurpations of power by the courts.70 There may be 
important prudential reasons for restraint in the exercise of such a 
heavy-handed power; some might seriously debate whether impeach­
ment on such grounds properly falls within the scope of the power to 
impeach for "high crimes and misdemeanors"; but there is no reason 
in principle why Congress is barred from independent consideration of 
these prudential and constitutional questions by reason of a claim that 
the judiciary's decisions are immune from constitutional scrutiny by 
the other branches.71 
proceeding unconstitutional, notwithstanding its prior holding that impeachment issues are 
nonjusticiable "political questions," see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)), on the ' 
ground that it interferes with independent judicial power and the Court's (asserted) final 
authority "to say what the law is." 
70. The propriety of impeachment of judicial officers for serious, willful disregard of the 
Constitution or other controlling law is strongly hinted at in two of Alexander Hamilton's 
papers of The Federalist describing the judiciary. The Federalist No. 81 contains the most ex­
tensive discussion, ending a passage on the lack of danger from judicial usurpations with the 
punchline that the impeachment power would serve as a check against such a possibility: 
It may in the last place be observed that the supposed danger of judiciary encroachments 
on the legislative authority, which has been upon many occasions reiterated, is in reality a 
phantom. Particular misconstructions and contraventions of the will of the legislature may 
now and then happen; but they can never be so extensive as to amount to an inconvenience, 
or in any sensible degree to affect the order of the political system. This may be inferred with 
certainty from the general nature of the judicial power, from the objects to which it relates, 
from the manner in which it is exercised, from its comparative weakness, and from its total 
incapacity to support its usurpations by force. And the inference is greatly fortified by the 
consideration of the important constitutional check which the power of instituting 
impeachments in one part of the legislative body, and of determining upon them in the 
other, would give to that body upon the members of the judicial department. This is alone a 
complete security. There never can be danger that the judges, by a series of deliberate usur­
pations on the authority of the legislature, would hazard the united resentment of the body 
intrusted with it, while this body was possessed of the means of punishing their presumption 
by degrading them from their stations. While this ought to remove all apprehensions on the 
subject it affords at the same time a cogent argument for constituting the Senate a court for 
the trial of impeachments. 
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 28, No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), at 453; see also id. , NO. 79, 
at 444 ("The precautions for [the judges'] responsibility are comprised in the article re­
specting impeachments. They are liable to be impeached for malconduct by the House of 
Representatives and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, may be dismissed from office and 
disqualified from holding any other. This is the only provision on the point which is consis­
tent with the necessary independence of the judicial character . . . .  "). 
71.  I hope to develop this theory in future work. For now, I will only respond to one ob­
vious objection: that impeachment for faithless constitutional decisions violates the idea of 
judicial independence. "Judicial independence," however, is not a freestanding constitu­
tional command; it is, rather, a consequence of a tenure of "good behavior" and salary guar-
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In addition to these strong, but blunt, front-end and back-end 
checks on interpretive abuse by the other branches, Congress's prov­
inces of constitutional interpretation also include the power to pro­
pose constitutional amendments; the coequal power to interpret 
extremely important constitutional provisions, like the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, that Congress explicitly has 
been given the power to "enforce" through legislation;72 and, indeed, 
the legislative power generally, including the vitally important appro­
priations power. As noted, every legislative enactment by Congress is, 
in a sense, an act of constitutional interpretation - an implicit asser­
tion by Congress that it has constitutional power to do what it is doing. 
And, whenever such an assertion runs up against the contrary views of 
the President or the courts, Congress legitimately may press its inde­
pendent constitutional views with all the legislative powers at its dis­
posal. It may not bind the other branches with its views, of course: that 
is the absolutely foundational principle of Marbury. But it follows by 
the same reasoning that the other branches may not bind Congress 
either. Congress has as much right to interpret the Constitution as 
does the Supreme Court, and arguably possesses greater powers with 
which to press its views. 
C. The Unconstitutionality of Stare Decisis 
If Marbury is right, the judicial doctrine of stare decisis - the prac­
tice of generally adhering to precedent "whether or not mistaken" -
is wrong.73 Stare decisis is, of course, not required by the Constitution, 
antees. "Good behavior" is properly understood as a description of tenure in office, not itself 
an impeachment standard, but that merely returns one to the question of whether deliberate 
disregard of the Constitution, in violation of one's oath, could be considered a "high crime 
or misdemeanor" (the standard that Article I I  imposes on all "Officers of the United 
States," a term that includes judges, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4) and the further question 
whether Congress has independent constitutional power to construe and apply this provi­
sion, or must accede to judicial interpretations of it. 
72. The Supreme Court has recently said that Congress does not have coequal power to 
interpret and apply the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, but is limited to 
enforcing judicial understandings of those amendments. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507 (1997). But that judicial view of the scope of Congress's power is, by the logic of the 
argument from Marbury sketched in the text, neither sound as a matter of principle nor 
binding on Congress when Congress is acting within its sphere. For persuasive arguments 
that City of Boerne is wrong in its specific interpretation of the scope of Congress's legisla­
tive power to enforce the provisions of the post-Civil War Amendments, see Michael W. 
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111  HARV. 
L. REV. 153 (1997); Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: City of Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE 
L.J. 115 (1999). 
73. The "whether or not mistaken" formulation comes from Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992), the Supreme Court's most ambitious exposition of the doc­
trine of stare decisis. I have explained elsewhere why this is the core of the doctrine. Paulsen, 
Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute, supra note 67, at 1 538 n.8. In short, the idea of adhering 
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as even the Supreme Court concedes.74 But even more fundamentally, 
when used in this strong sense of adhering to precedents even if 
wrong, stare decisis is unconstitutional. (In any other sense, stare deci­
sis is simply irrelevant, or deceptive: a court that invokes the doctrine 
to justify a decision it was prepared to reach on other grounds is 
adding a makeweight, or using the doctrine as a cover for its judgment 
on the merits.) 
Consider again what Marbury says: The Constitution is supreme, 
paramount law, superior in obligation to other law. The judges are 
bound by the Constitution; the instrument is a rule for the government 
of courts. Imagine if you will - it isn't hard to do - a judicial decision 
that is not consistent with the Constitution; that ignores its provisions, 
or construes them wrongly; or where the Court has plainly exceeded 
the limits marked out by the Constitution's allocation of powers: 
Marbury says, with respect to legislative actions of such description, 
that "[t]he constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchange­
able by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, 
and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to 
alter it."75 The same holds true of judicial actions that depart from the 
Constitution: The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, 
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is alterable when the judiciary 
shall please to alter it. A doctrine of stare decisis that holds that a 
faithless judicial interpretation of the Constitution at time Tl is 
binding at time T2 is a doctrine of judicial alteration of the paramount 
law. If the Constitution is not alterable whenever the judiciary shall 
please to alter it, then "a [judicial precedent] contrary to the constitu­
tion is not law;" and if the alternative is true, that the Constitution is 
alterable at the judiciary's option, "then written constitutions are 
absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own 
nature illimitable. "76 
The idea of precedent is almost sacrosanct to lawyers, conditioned 
by the common law and the case method, so much so that few have 
examined carefully its premises and whether those premises are com­
patible with a system that purports to accord primacy to a written, en­
acted text. But on what principle may one generation of judges pur­
port to transform its power to decide cases into a prospective power to 
bind future judges in future cases? On what principle may a judge in a 
to precedent, as an independent duty, has bite only if a court would decide the case differ­
ently absent such a supposed duty. Id. at 1538 n.8. 
74. As to the nonconstitutional status of the doctrine, see Paulsen, Abrogating Stare De­
cisis by Statute, supra note 67, at 1537 n.1 (collecting cases acknowledging that the doctrine is 
one of judicial policy and not constitutional requirement); id. at 1543-51 (discussing and 
analyzing same). 
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
76. Id. 
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later case abandon his or her sworn duty to uphold the Constitution by 
deliberately following a precedent that the judge believes is inconsis­
tent with that Constitution? Under the reasoning of Marbury, the 
Constitution must always be given preference over the faithless acts of 
mere government agents that depart from it. The Constitution is 
paramount law and must take precedence (so to speak) over prece­
dents that depart from it.77 
It follows, I submit, that no court should ever deliberately adhere 
to what it is fully persuaded are the erroneous constitutional decisions 
of the past. To do so is to act in deliberate violation of the 
Constitution. The judicial doctrine of stare decisis - the idea that 
courts should (as they sometimes say they do, and as they sometimes 
in fact do) adhere to the principles of prior cases even when persuaded 
that those principles are wrong as a matter of the correct interpreta­
tion of the Constitution or other controlling federal law - is funda­
mentally inconsistent with the Constitution and with the logic of 
Marbury itself. The doctrine should be repudiated entirely in the area 
of constitutional law.78 
And that goes for lower courts, too. Why should lower court 
judges be bound by higher court precedent, including Supreme Court 
precedent, where they are fully persuaded that the precedent is not 
consistent with the Constitution itself? Marbury says the Constitution 
is supreme; that departures from it cannot be regarded as binding; that 
the Constitution supplies a rule for the government of courts; and that 
the oath requires that its takers be guided by their best understanding 
of the Constitution and not pliantly accede to deviations perpetrated 
by others. All of these points apply to lower court judges - state and 
federal - who are called upon to decide cases arising under the 
Constitution and swear Article VI's mandated oath to support it. 
Unless some other constitutional provision trumps or ousts Marbury's 
77. The argument in this paragraph owes much to a short article by Professor Gary 
Lawson several years ago. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 27-28 (1994) ("If the Constitution says X and a prior judicial 
decision says Y, a court has not merely the power, but the obligation, to prefer the 
Constitution."); see also Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 408 (1988) (arguing that "judges are 
oath-bound to rule in accordance with the Constitution, not with prior opinions interpreting 
the Constitution"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of 
Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 
ALB. L. REV. 671, 680 (1995) [hereinafter Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise 
of Constitutional Interpretation] ("{S]tare decisis is not just another bad idea. It is, I think, 
unconstitutional."). 
78. Of course, I invoke Marbury as persuasive authority only; by its own reasoning, it 
would not be controlling if it were wrong on the point in question. And it is wrong on many 
other points. See Paulsen, Marbury's Wrongness, supra note 17. But for those who worship at 
the altar of precedent, it is at the very least rather ironic that Marbury v. Madison, widely 
regarded as the foundational case of all constitutional law - a worthy precedent if ever 
there were one - logically dictates that precedent can never be regarded as controlling 
where it departs from a proper understanding of the Constitution. 
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reasoning as applied in this context - the words "supreme" and "infe­
rior" in Article III are plausible candidates, but do not necessarily im­
ply anything more than a hierarchy in which a higher court may review 
and reverse the judgment of a lower court, and do not transform such 
lower court judges into mere law clerks or potted plants79 -
Marbury's logic applies for lower courts as well as others. Thus, a 
lower court may, and arguably must, "underrule" (to coin a term)80 
Supreme Court precedents that depart from a sound reading of the 
written Constitution. The Supreme Court usually will have the 
authority and jurisdiction to review and reverse such lower court un­
derrulings; such jurisdiction is consistent with Article III and the con­
stitutional structure generally.81 But that does not mean that the lower 
court judges are personally required to abet the constitutional viola­
tion. They can, and should, make the Supreme Court do its own dirty 
work. They can, and must, exercise their own (reverse-able) constitu­
tional interpretive power independently, and correctly. 
D. State Interposition and Nullification 
The terms "interposition" and "nullification" are practically consti­
tutional profanities these days. The terms are associated with seces­
sionists of the mid-nineteenth century and segregationists of the 
mid-twentieth, both of whom employed somewhat warped notions of 
state interpretive authority in the service of the most unjust of causes. 
But the correctness of a constitutional theory cannot be judged by its 
misappropriation and misapplication by constitutional hijackers, in­
cluding South Carolina's John Calhoun, the name most prominently 
associated with the theory.82 
79. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of 
Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 77-88 (1989) (hereinafter Paulsen, 
Accusing Justice] (arguing that the word "supreme" only requires that the Supreme Court be 
a court of final jurisdiction in the sense that no appeal lies to another court; that the word 
"inferior" does not mean subordinate in the sense of being an agent of a principal; and that 
Article III provides for the structural equivalence of all federal judges). The phrase "potted 
plants" comes from Sanford Levinson, On Positivism & Potted Plants: "Inferior" Judges and 
the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843 (1993) (making a similar 
suggestion). 
80. Paulsen, Accusing Justice, supra note 79, at 82 (defending power of lower court 
judges to "underrule" Roe v. Wade, if fully persuaded of its incorrectness as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation). 
81. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) . 
82. For an excellent historical treatment of nullification, see WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, 
PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
1816-1836 (1965). For a lucid untangling of the assorted (and sordid) constitutional theories 
propounded at various times on this subject, see DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S 
CONSTITUTION 26-91 (2003). 
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The doctrines of interposition and nullification have reasonably 
respectable roots. The idea of independent state authority to interpret 
the Constitution - and to resist asserted violations of the Constitution 
by the instrumentalities of the national government - dates back at 
least a half-decade before Marbury, to the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, and James Madison's "Report of 1800" 
for the Commonwealth of Virginia.83 Indeed, they can claim support 
earlier yet, in the political theory of federalism and state checks on 
national power set forth in The Federalist.84 
Interestingly, the idea of state government authority to interpret 
the federal Constitution finds much to commend it in the reasoning of 
Marbury: the Constitution is supreme, not the actions of subordinate 
agencies under it; departures from the Constitution thus cannot be 
regarded as obligatory and binding lest we overthrow in fact what is 
established in theory; and those who swear an oath to support the 
Constitution must interpret it faithfully and independently and could 
not have been intended to have been forced to violate their 
consciences by accepting the unsound constitutional judgments of oth-
83. The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, the Answers of several other states' legisla­
tures, and Madison's Report are reprinted in 4 ELLIOTI'S DEBATES, at 528-80 (2d ed. 1891). 
84. For strong indications of support for this position in The Federalist, see THE 
FEDERALIST, supra note 28, No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), at 206-07 ("If the representatives 
of the people betray their constituents, there is then no resource left but in the exertion of 
that original right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of government, 
and which against the usurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted with infinitely bet­
ter prospect of success than against those of the rulers of an individual state . . . .  Power being 
almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to 
check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition to­
wards the general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will 
infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of 
the other as the instrument of redress . . . . It may safely be received as an axiom in our politi­
cal system, that the State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete 
security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority . . . .  [P]ossessing all 
the organs of civil power, and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular 
plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the community."); id. No. 
33, at 225 ("But it will not follow from this doctrine [i.e. , the Supremacy Clause of Article 
VI] that acts of the larger society which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers, but 
which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies, will become the su­
preme law of the land. These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated 
as such."); id. No. 44, at 290 (noting that the people, by the "election of more faithful repre­
sentatives," may "annul the acts of the usurpers. The truth is, that this ultimate redress may 
be more confided in against the unconstitutional acts of the federal than of the State legisla­
tures, for this plain reason, that as every such act of the former will be an invasion of the 
rights of the latter"); id. No. 51 ,  at 321 ("In a single republic, all the power surrendered by 
the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations 
are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. 
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided 
between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among 
distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. 
The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be con­
trolled by itself."); id. No. 84, at 478 ("The executive and legislative bodies of each State will 
be so many sentinels over the persons employed in every department of the national admini­
stration . . . .  "). 
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ers. Again, all these points apply to state government officials who are 
called on to consider federal constitutional issues within the sphere of 
their state government functions, and who likewise swear an oath, 
pursuant to Article VI, to support the Constitution. True, officers of 
state governments are not coordinate departments of the national 
government, as Congress, the President, and the judiciary are. But 
everything else in Marbury applies, and Marbury makes as much of 
the idea of constitutional supremacy, and of the obligation of the oath, 
as it does the coordinacy of the branches of the federal government. 
It follows, I submit, that state government officials, who likewise 
swear an oath to support the U.S. Constitution as "supreme law of the 
Land,'' are not bound to submit docilely to unconstitutional actions of 
the agencies of the national government. By the logic of Marbury, they 
cannot be bound by the erroneous constitutional views of organs of 
the national government, but are empowered, even required, to inter­
pret the Constitution directly. But note that, just as Marbury's proof of 
independent judicial authority to interpret the Constitution does not 
properly imply judicial interpretive supremacy, neither does the exis­
tence of state interpretive competence imply state interpretive omnipo­
tence. This, or some modified version of it, was Calhoun's mistake. 
States are not bound by federal interpretations, but the federal gov­
ernment is not bound by states' interpretations either.85 
The right answer is that every government actor - state and 
federal - is sworn to uphold the Constitution, and that none is the 
master of the others in terms of what adherence to that oath requires. 
85. The same holds for state secession. President Abraham Lincoln's argument against 
secession is absolutely sound: the Constitution confers no unilateral, plenary right of a state 
to secede. No state has a right to secede that the Nation as a whole must honor - a state's 
interpretation does not, and cannot, bind the national government. See Lincoln, First 
Inaugural Address, reprinted in 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES & WRITINGS, 1859-1865: 
SPEECHES, LETIERS, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS, PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES & 
PROCLAMATIONS 218 ("[N)o State, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the 
Union . . . . ") . But Lincoln also thought it necessary to argue that no violation of the 
Constitution had occurred that might be thought to justify secession, id. at 219 ("Is it true, 
then, that any right, plainly written in the Constitution, has been denied? I think not."), ap­
parently conceding the plausibility of the argument that a state might legitimately secede as 
an extreme remedy for an extremely serious breach of the Constitution by the federal 
government. Id. at 219 ("If, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should deprive a mi­
nority of any clearly written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify 
revolution - certainly would, if such right were a vital one. But such is not our case."). 
The question of secession is distinguishable in important respects from the question of 
interposition, but both potentially share the idea that state governments may, and arguably 
must, interpret the U.S. Constitution, and may with propriety resist violations of the 
Constitution by the federal government with whatever powers are available to state 
governments to check such abuses. But the existence of such state interpretive power surely 
does not bind the organs of federal government, which may properly resist state misinterpre­
tations or abuses of the Constitution with all the power at their disposal, in order to correct 
such state departures from the Constitution. See, e.g. , Grant v. Lee (Appomattox Court 
House, Apr. 1 865). I develop the interposition and secession points at greater length in a 
forthcoming essay. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpreta­
tion, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). 
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Each branch of the federal government possesses coequal interpretive 
authority with the others and may seek to make its interpretation of 
the Constitution "stick," so to speak, with the constitutional powers at 
its disposal.86 So too state government actors possess, by virtue of their 
oaths to support the U.S. Constitution and the supremacy of the 
written Constitution over all instrumentalities of the federal 
government, the prerogative and duty faithfully and independently to 
interpret the Constitution of the United States and to resist, with the 
powers at their disposal, violations of that Constitution by the federal 
government. Just as no branch of the federal government has interpre­
tive supremacy, no level of government - federal or state - has 
interpretive supremacy. The precise accommodation of conflicting 
views is a function of the interaction among branches of government 
and between levels of government. 
Now, this should be a bit unsettling. This is Governor George 
Wallace standing in the schoolhouse door.87 But it is also James 
Madison and Thomas Jefferson leading Virginia and Kentucky in 
resistance to the Sedition Act, and vindicating the Constitution in the 
election of 1800. The fact that a constitutional theory or power might 
be misused does not prove that it is wrong. Interposition, like the 
Force, is a double-edged saber; it can be used for good or for evil, 
depending on how and by whom it is being wielded. This is true of 
interpretive power generally, including quite obviously interpretive 
power as wielded by the Supreme Court.88 The true question is 
whether the Constitution provides for a multiplicity of interpreters, 
each independent of the others and armed with only a portion of the 
constitutional power to make their interpretations stick, or instead 
provides for a single authoritative interpreter whose decisions are con­
clusive and binding on all other actors, even where they are wrong -
contrary to the written Constitution that is our paramount law - and 
even where they are wicked. 
86. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 28, NO. 49 (James Madison), at 313 ("The several de­
partments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of 
them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries 
between their respective powers."). 
87. See Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional 
Interpretation, supra note 78, at 688 (using the same example). In addition, there are impor­
tant theoretical problems with treating a state's constitutional interpretations as possessing 
parity with interpretations advanced by organs of the national government, some of which 
may require important qualifications to any theory of state interpretive autonomy - re­
finements I hope to develop in future work. For an enlightening brief treatment, see 
FARBER, supra note 82, at 45-69. Cf Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 1 1  at 
312-16. 
88. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214 (1944); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 
(16 Pet.) 539 (1842). See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitlllional Deci­
sion of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003). 
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Marbury's answer is that the latter proposition "would subvert the 
very foundation of all written constitutions"89 and thus "reduce[] to 
nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political 
institutions."90 Marbury's logic endorses instead a multiplicity of voices 
in constitutional interpretation, each independent of the others. To the 
extent that the implications of this position depart greatly from 
present constitutional practice - and they do - present practice 
represents a betrayal of the principles of Marbury v. Madison. 
* * * * * 
Now, I know what you're thinking: If this is truly where Marbury 
leads, following it would be anarchy! Chaos! Madness! 
Calm down. Lawyers are lovers of order and prone to see disaster 
in the slightest degree of disagreement, disequilibrium, and disorder. 
A multiplicity of voices is not the end of the world. It is simply a 
decentralized approach to constitutional interpretation. Decentraliza­
tion is not chaos; it is simply the antithesis of centralized interpretive 
authority. It is an example of "checks and balances." If there is one 
thing we know about the Framers, it is that they feared the concentra­
tion of power and sought to prevent it in the design of the 
Constitution. Would it not be somewhat ironic (and quite unlikely) for 
the Framers, so concerned with the division and dispersal of power 
generally, to have concentrated the power to interpret all other powers 
and to bind all other actors with those interpretations in a single insti­
tution or organ of government? Marbury certainly suggests no such 
thing; practically every sentence of the opinion points in precisely the 
opposite direction. The power of constitutional interpretation - the 
power, in Marbury's sonorous words, "to say what the law is" - is not 
vested in a single, authoritative body, but, like any other power too 
important to place in a single set of hands, is a divided, shared power. 
Division and shared responsibility admits of the possibility of 
disagreement, competing interpretations, ongoing tension, struggle, 
compromise (or deadlock), and lack of a definitive resolution. In other 
words, it admits of - indeed, virtually assures - exactly what separa,­
tion of powers is designed to produce as a general proposition. Over 
time, and across a broad range of issues, such an arrangement tends to 
produce a kind of general equilibrium - not perfect stability or 
repose, but general equilibrium. (Does a regime of judicial supremacy 
really do any better than that?) Rough stability in the law is achieved, 
under such a model, not by the edicts of a centralized authority, but by 
the pull and tug of competing interpreters and competing interpreta-
89. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) 137, 178 ( 1803). 
90. Id. 
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tions, none of whom is bound by the views of the others and each of 
whom, armed with separate powers and overlapping spheres of 
authority, may press the interpretation it thinks is truest to the 
Constitution. Often, this will produce a core of consensus. It will also 
often produce a periphery of uncertainty, especially as to issues on 
which there is no agreed correct resolution. But that is as it should be. 
Where an issue remains genuinely contested, and the several branches 
of government legitimately and in good faith continue to disagree, the 
issue should remain unsettled. 
E. Interpretive Methodology 
Ah, you say, but there's the rub: All of this assumes legitimate 
disagreement, good faith interpretive differences, genuine disputes 
over constitutional meaning. What if one branch, or body, advances a 
highly idiosyncratic interpretation, not remotely supportable by fair 
reasoning from the Constitution, and insists, for its own policy or 
self-interested purposes, on pressing such a position to the wall? 
Decentralization permits a whole array of opportunities for bizarre, 
potentially destructive interpretive methodologies by any of a number 
of actors. 
Put to one side for a moment the obvious possibility that a single 
authoritative interpreter might do exactly the same thing, but without 
any other authority supplying an effective check on such interpretive 
abuse. Also put to one side that this possibility might well be thought 
by many a fair characterization of the actual practice of the modern 
Supreme Court under the Myth of Marbury. The rhetorical force of 
this concern lies in the perception that the notion of "interpretation" 
permits the Interpreter to bend the Constitution to his will; and that, 
consequently, the only way to constrain the results is to designate an 
authoritative interpreter who can slap down everybody else, and to 
choose the branch or body least likely to be willful in its own interpre­
tations. 
Marbury rejects this approach in two ways. First, as already 
discussed, it eschews the single-authoritative-interpreter approach 
entirely, resting instead on constitutional supremacy and the absurdity 
(and immorality) of binding one actor with the unconstitutional acts of 
another. The second point is more subtle, but it is implicit throughout 
Marshall's analysis: the whole idea that the Constitution is supreme 
and that one actor cannot be bound by the unconstitutional action of 
another presupposes that there is some objective meaning to the 
Constitution that stands on its own, apart from the interpretations 
or applications of that document by any particular actor. The 
Constitution means what it means. When Marshall uses the hypotheti­
cal of a treason conviction based on the testimony of one, rather than 
two, witnesses to the same overt act, he is supposing that the meaning 
2740 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101 :2706 
of the provision in question is something that exists independently of 
the interpretation offered by some person or institution, so that any 
objective observer might be able to judge that the person or institution 
doing the interpreting just plain got it wrong. The words and phrases 
of the Constitution have discernible, objective meaning. They are not 
empty vessels waiting ·to have content poured into them by an 
Interpreter. Without such an understanding of constitutional meaning, 
Marbury simply makes no sense. 
Marbury, I submit, assumes that the proper way - the only proper 
way - to read the Constitution is to give the words, phrases, and 
structures of the text the ordinary, natural or (occasionally) 
specialized meaning they would have had, in context, to reasonably 
informed readers and speakers of the English language in America, at 
the time those words and phrases were employed.91 Marshall does not 
say this in so many words, but it is implicit in every step he takes and 
every move he makes. The idea that the powers of and limitations on 
government are written is vitally important, says Marshall, at innumer­
able points in Marbury. 
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those 
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written . . . .  
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate 
them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and 
consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of 
the legislature repugnant to the constitution, is void. 
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is conse­
quently to be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental princi­
ples of our society. It is not therefore to be lost sight of in the further 
consideration of this subject. . . .  
[To maintain] that courts must close their eyes on the constitution . . .  
would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions . . . . That it 
thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement 
on political institutions - a written constitution - would of itself be suffi­
cient, in America, where written constitutions have been viewed with so 
much reverence, for rejecting the construction . . . .  [C]ourts, as well as 
other departments, are bound by that instrument.92 
91 . For a defense of this methodology as the proper approach to constitutional interpre­
tation, see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution 's Secret Drafting History, 92 GEO L.J. (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Kesavan 
& Paulsen, The Interpretive Force]; see also Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, ls 
West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 291, 398-99 (2002) [hereinafter Kesavan & 
Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?]. 
92. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-78, 180 (emphasis added). 
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More than that, it is this very writtenness of the Constitution that, in 
Marbury, supplies both the basis for judicial review and the standard 
for judging whether another branch has departed from the 
Constitution. The paramount authority of the written text is the core of 
the argument for the power of judicial review and the controlling stan­
dard for the practice of judicial ,review. Marbury, quite simply, stands 
for textualism as the proper method of constitutional interpretation.93 
We tend to forget or ignore this, because we are imprisoned by the 
Myth of Marbury. The myth of judicial supremacy tends to generate 
the corollary myth of plenary power over interpretive method. 
Because what the Court says controls, there is no control over what 
the Court says. The Court's power "to say what the law is" becomes 
"the law is what the Court says it is. "94 Whatever the Court says, goes. 
What Marbury says, however, is that whatever the Constitution 
says, goes. The courts don't get to say whatever they want. They are 
"bound by that instrument."95 There remains, of course, the enduring 
question about how to interpret that instrument - how to give effect 
to the authority of the written text - but that is a question to be 
answered by a different article.96 For present purposes, it is sufficient 
here to note that the actual opinion in Marbury, as distinct from the 
myth that has grown up around it, rejects modern notions of interpre­
tive freedom or interpretive license. The text strictly constrains what 
93. Two refinements: first, "textualism" - the authority of the written text - in 
Marbury's argument for judicial review includes arguments from the logic of the constitu­
tional structure created by the text. In other words, textualism embraces not only specific 
words and phrases, but the architecture of the text as well. Marbury is clearly all about the 
structure and architecture created by the written text, as well as specific provisions. Second, 
to say that Marbury embraces textualism as the appropriate interpretive method in constitu­
tional law is not to say that Marshall's analysis of the constitutional text is sound, in all re­
spects, throughout the opinion - for example, with respect to his holding that Section 13 of 
the Judiciary Act violates Article I I I  of the Constitution. See Paulsen, Marbury's Wrongness, 
supra note 17. Textualism can be the correct method of interpreting the Constitution and 
still admit of some sharp disagreements as to the proper result to be reached by employing 
that method in any particular case. 
94. Charles Evans Hughes, Speech before the Chamber of Commerce, Elmira, NY 
(May 3, 1907), in ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, GOVERNOR OF 
NEW YORK, 1906 - 1908 at 139 (1908) ("We are under a Constitution . . . .  The Constitution 
is what the judges say it is."). 
95. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180. 
96. Fortunately, Vasan Kesavan and I have written the article that answers that 
question ( ! ). Kesavan & Paulsen, The Interpretive Force, supra note 91. The correct answer, 
we submit, is that the Constitution itself (in Article Vi's specification of "[tjhis Constitution" 
as the supreme law of the land, see U.S. CONST. art. VI (Supremacy Clause) (emphasis 
added), and the nature of written constitutionalism generally), requires a methodology of 
original, objective-public-meaning textualism. By that we mean the following: The 
Constitution should be interpreted according to the meaning the words and phrases em­
ployed would have had, considered in historical context and within the context of the docu­
ment as a whole, to an ordinary, reasonably informed reader or speaker of the English lan­
guage in the relevant political community at the time the text was adopted as law. See also 
Kesavan & Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, supra note 91, at 398-99. 
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may with propriety be done in the name of the Constitution. And if 
what is done in the name of the Constitution is not consistent with the 
text, fidelity to "that instrument" requires fidelity to the text, and not 
what has been wrongly done in its name. 
Thus, what seems to scare sensible people about coordinate and 
decentralized constitutional interpretation is that the interpreters 
might think themselves properly possessed of Marbury-Myth-like 
interpretive license to do whatever they like - that they might think 
that their equal power to say what the law is means that whatever they 
say, or whatever they can get away with saying, goes. But is that not 
something of a straw man? If, after all, what is being objected to is the 
theory of decentralized constitutional interpretive power, flowing from 
the logic of Marbury's argument for judicial review, should not one be 
required to challenge that theory on grounds consistent with 
Marbury's other assumptions about how interpretive power is legiti­
mately to be employed? 
To be sure, a "presidential activist" in constitutional interpretation 
is a dangerous constitutional loose cannon. To be sure, a state gov­
ernment that feels free to interpret the Constitution in a manner cut 
loose from the constraints of the objective, original meaning of the 
text's words and phrases is a dangerous centripetal force. To be sure, if 
Congress cares not about the document itself, but decides, 
Humpty-Dumpty-like, that words mean whatever Congress wants 
them to mean, we could see a great fall. As I have written elsewhere: 
The more that interpretive power is conjoined with practical governing 
power, the more important it is that interpretive power be constrained by 
the relatively clear boundaries of text, intention, and structure. 97 
If one is to shed the Myth of Marbury, one must shed it completely. If 
one is to embrace Marbury in all its implications, one must embrace 
those implications fully. And if one does so, that is a constitutional 
world in which multiple actors, exercising their independent interpre­
tive power, strive in good faith to check one another and hold each 
other to the meaning of the words of the Constitution's text, and to 
guard against departures from the nation's paramount law by any of 
the branches or organs of federal or state government. What a 
wonderful, wonderful world that would be. 
IV. CODA 
Alas, that is not the constitutional world we inhabit today. Instead, 
we live in a constitutional world in which the Supreme Court is sultan 
and a perversion of Marbury v. Madison is our governing constitu­
tional myth. The myth is, by now, an ingrained one. The Supreme 
97. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 1 1 ,  at 342. 
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Court lives by the myth. The political branches by and large have 
accepted it.98 And it has been taught as Holy Writ to several genera­
tions of elementary school and law school students. Disentangling our 
political culture from the Myth of Marbury is not a mere day's work. 
On this, the occasion of Marbury's 200th anniversary, however, it 
is worth reflecting on the fact that The Myth is a betrayal of 
everything that Marbury stands for, and a betrayal of the written 
Constitution that Marbury identifies as the appropriate object of· 
veneration. 
98. See Paulsen, Nixon Now, supra note 12, at 1358-59 ("The judiciary's assertion of 
hegemony does not make it so, of course . . . .  Unfortunately, however, acceptance of the 
judiciary's assertion of hegemony by the other branches tends to validate such hegemony as 
a practical matter."). 
